An efficient privatization mechanism
We consider the privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of which markets can be opened to competition once privatization takes place and competitors can compete successfully against them in a few years. The currently used “Revenue Maximization (RM)” scheme maximizes the government revenue from privatization but does not provide incentives for the privatized SOE to charge a price lower than the monopoly price until competition arises. We propose the “Welfare Maximization (WM)” scheme, which induces the privatized SOE to charge a competitive price without resorting to regulation. Also, WM provides greater incentives for post-privatization cost reduction.
Volume (Year): 2 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, June.
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