Anthropological Foundations of Kant’s and Sen’s Models of Social Rationality

The paper aims to illuminate the overlooked parallels between Amartya Sen’s capability approach and Kant’s pragmatic anthropology with the model of social rationality at its core. These parallels have been largely neglected due to Sen’s emphasis on Kant’s moral philosophy and deontic principles, at the expense of his views of social interaction, human imperfection, and conflicts. Sen’s arguments regarding the connection between freedom, social development and rationality resonate with Kant’s core anthropological arguments on freedom as a basic principle of developing social agency, although Sen misinterprets Kant’s perspective on human interests. His pragmatic conception of “imperfect” justice in politics is not merely an adaptation of Rawls’ theory; it is also rooted in a longer tradition that traces back to Kant’s reflections on the flawed character of human society and the necessity of communicative rationality. Consequently, Kant’s anthropology proves crucial in addressing a major issue of Sen’s approach – the problem of selecting adequate capabilities. Kant’s balanced view of individual and collective interests, particularly his anthropologically applied concepts of prudence, public use of reason, and unsocial sociability, enable us to employ his anthropological model of social rationality in explaining Sen’s understanding of how we choose our capabilities.