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Liberal economic nationalism, financial stability, and Commission leniency in Banking Union

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  • Shawn Donnelly

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that protection and promotion of insolvent banks remains a high priority for national authorities in Europe, and the Commission partially accommodates these impulses in the desire to preserve national financial stability. Insolvent banks are kept alive despite Banking Union rules on resolution designed to facilitate their closure at the cost of private investors. Italian and Portuguese cases demonstrate that pressure to relax state aid rules is strongest where problems are the greatest. However, the long-term trend is still an incremental decrease in national leeway to protect and promote national bank ownership.

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  • Shawn Donnelly, 2018. "Liberal economic nationalism, financial stability, and Commission leniency in Banking Union," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 21(2), pages 159-173, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jecprf:v:21:y:2018:i:2:p:159-173
    DOI: 10.1080/17487870.2017.1400433
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    Cited by:

    1. Eckert, Sandra, 2020. "EU agencies in banking and energy between institutional and policy centralisation," SAFE Working Paper Series 278, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.

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