Cartels, Spontaneous Price Discrimination and International Pharmacy Retailing
This paper examines the nature of pharmacy retail distribution in several different countries. Evidence in the market place supports the view that innovations in distribution technology are or could be plentiful; conversely, because of institutional rigidities bolstered by law, retail pharmacists in many countries are successfully participating in a cartel-like environment where those innovations are retarded. The outcome is often perverse. Retailers do not achieve economies of scale (a common argument in favour of cartels), while consumers do not experience the lower prices resulting from inter-firm rivalry (a common argument in favour of diffuse ownership)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 4 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CIJB20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CIJB20|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:4:y:1997:i:3:p:279-285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.