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Motives for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma

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  • Mark Schneider
  • Timothy Shields

Abstract

We investigate the motives for cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). A prior study finds that cooperation rates in one-shot PD games can be ranked empirically by the social surplus from cooperation. That study employs symmetric payoffs from cooperation in simultaneous PD games. Hence, in that setting, it is not possible to discern the motives for cooperation since three prominent social welfare criteria, social surplus (efficiency) preferences, Rawlsian maximin preferences, and inequity aversion make the same predictions. In the present paper, we conduct an experiment to identify which of these social preferences best explains differences in cooperation rates and to study the effects of the risk of non-cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Schneider & Timothy Shields, 2022. "Motives for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma," Journal of Behavioral Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 438-456, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:hbhfxx:v:23:y:2022:i:4:p:438-456
    DOI: 10.1080/15427560.2022.2081974
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