Endogenous Lobbying and Protection under Monopolistic Competition
This paper studies the “Protection for Sale” model in the setting of monopolistic competition drawing on the quadratic sub-utility model. This model generates two new findings: (1) the average cross-price elasticity, in particular, only among foreign varieties in a sector negatively influences the level of protection; (2) the total number of domestic varieties over one of the foreign varieties in a sector, a new proxy for political power of domestic lobby groups in that sector, positively influences the level of protection.
Volume (Year): 40 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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