The Russian resort to hybrid warfare: from Peter the great to Gerasimov

Since the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea and the proxy war in the Donbas, the term hybrid warfare has gained significant traction. It has been used to describe Moscow’s asymmetric actions (as well as those of other state and non-state actors) and refers to the ability to combine military tools (both regular and irregular) with non-military and non-conventional instruments (diplomatic, political, economic, informational). Yet, by examining the history of Russian strategic thought and observing how Russia has conducted the conflicts in which it has been involved, one can discern a marked inclination toward the use of so-called hybrid tools that can be traced back at least to the time of Peter the Great. This demonstrates a certain rootedness of the idea that it is possible to exploit means and methods not strictly belonging to the military sphere – an approach that was also present during the Soviet era, despite the dogmatic refusal to broaden the concept of war to include non-military instruments. The major debate on the wars of the future that marked the two decades following the dissolution of the USSR allowed the Kremlin to develop such tools even more effectively.