Russia’s state capture strategy in Africa, from Wagner to the Africa corps

While much of the literature on state capture focuses on corrupt business networks, the concept can also elucidate how powerful armed actors can co-opt government officials and institutions to influence policymaking. This article argues that Russia leveraged the activities of the Wager Group in Africa to pursue a form of state capture. Drawing on expert interviews and open-source intelligence, it presents evidence from the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, and demonstrates how Wagner and Russia acquired a measure of influence over several embattled strongmen who proved willing to serve the Kremlin’s interests and partake in corrupt business deals. Even after Wagner’s ill-fated 2023 mutiny and its subsequent restructuring into the Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense, state capture has continued to define the Kremlin’s ambitions in Africa. Although this strategy has yielded mixed results for Russia, it has worsened the political and economic outlooks of several fragile states, creating new challenges to international security.