Beyond state capture: the case of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Janjaweed militia, the precursor to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), were once allied in the internal war that broke out in Darfur in 2003. However, this alliance has since unravelled, with the SAF and RSF now locked in a devastating struggle for control of the state. What led a formerly state-controlled proxy to evolve into a militia intent on re-shaping and dominating the state? While the SAF long maintained the state’s monopoly on legitimate coercion, its counterinsurgency in Darfur lacked the necessary reach and manpower. In response, the SAF outsourced much of the fighting to local proxies. In the final years of President al-Bashir’s regime, the RSF gained increasing political leverage, becoming a tool for coup-proofing the regime. This shift allowed the RSF to expand its influence and grow into a powerful actor with ambitions beyond its original mandate. Existing studies on state-militia relations have exposed critical vulnerabilities in state strategies designed to co-opt militias. This article builds on this body of research and presents new fieldwork-based evidence to demonstrate that powerful militias like the RSF can ultimately turn against the state, seeking not just to influence its policies but to capture institutions and resources, with destructive consequences.