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Takeover defenses, golden parachutes, and bargaining over stochastic synergy gains: a note on optimal contracting


  • Atreya Chakraborty
  • Abdikarim Farah
  • John Barkoulas


We incorporate managerial risk aversion and stochasticity of takeover synergy gains into Harris' (Harris, E.G. 1990. Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder welfare. Rand Journal of Economics 21, no. 4: 614-25. bargaining model for the coexistence of antitakeover defenses and golden parachutes in corporate charters. We show that: (i) it is not always optimal that the target-firm shareholders adopt antitakeover defenses, (ii) the size of the golden parachute is proportional to the riskiness of the synergistic gains, and (iii) the target-firm shareholders are unequivocally better-off with golden parachutes than takeover-contingent stock options.

Suggested Citation

  • Atreya Chakraborty & Abdikarim Farah & John Barkoulas, 2008. "Takeover defenses, golden parachutes, and bargaining over stochastic synergy gains: a note on optimal contracting," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 273-280.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:14:y:2008:i:4:p:273-280
    DOI: 10.1080/13518470802041684

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