Has the iron fist against criminal gangs really worked in El Salvador?

Violence due to organized crime takes a heavy social and economic toll on many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. El Salvador, historically known for having one of the highest homicide rates in the world, recently became one of the safest countries in America. In this transformation, the arrival of Nayib Bukele and the implementation of the Territorial Control Plan and the establishment of the state of emergency played a key role. This strategy involved strengthening security institutions, introducing new regulations, conducting mass detentions and implementing general surveillance. Using a regression discontinuity in time design, we find that the two extraordinarily tough flagship criminal policies of this plan against gangs reduced the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants by approximately 45 points between 2019 and 2024, accounting for almost three quarters of the reduction over the period analysed. We argue that these policies significantly enhanced the state’s incapacitation and deterrence capacities, creating an extremely hostile environment for the maras and dramatically undermining their ability to continue criminal activities. In this sense, despite the severe decline in democratic norms caused by Bukele’s strategy, its effectiveness in reducing homicide rates in El Salvador in the short to medium term is undisputed.