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Allocating Security Expenditures under Knightian Uncertainty: An Info-Gap Approach

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  • Michael Ben-Gad
  • Yakov Ben-Haim
  • Dan Peled

Abstract

We apply the information gap approach to resource allocation under Knightian (non-probabilistic) uncertainty in order to study how best to allocate public resources between competing defence measures. We demonstrate that when determining the level and composition of defence spending in an environment of extreme uncertainty vis-a-vis the likelihood of armed conflict and its outcomes, robust-satisficing-expected utility will usually be preferable to expected utility maximisation. Moreover, our analysis suggests that in environments with unreliable information about threats to national security and their consequences, a desire for robustness to model misspecification in the decision-making process will imply greater expenditure on certain types of defence measures at the expense of others. Our results also provide a positivist explanation of how governments seem to allocate security expenditures in practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Ben-Gad & Yakov Ben-Haim & Dan Peled, 2020. "Allocating Security Expenditures under Knightian Uncertainty: An Info-Gap Approach," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(7), pages 830-850, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:31:y:2020:i:7:p:830-850
    DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2019.1625518
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    1. Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 563-587, August.
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    4. Brito, D L, 1972. "A Dynamic Model of an Armaments Race," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(2), pages 359-375, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Ben‐Gad, 2022. "Russia versus the West: Facing the long‐term challenge," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 385-394, June.
    2. Gitana Dudzevičiūtė & Vida Česnuitytė & Dalia Prakapienė, 2021. "Defence Expenditure–Government Debt Nexus in the Context of Sustainability in Selected Small European Union Countries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-18, June.

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