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Predatory Behavior Of Governments: The Case Of Mass Killing


  • Sang Hoo Bae
  • Attiat Ott


In this paper we seek to answer the question: why do governments engage in mass killing? Tullock (1974) gives gain or avoidance of loss as the motive. We construct a three-stage theoretic framework to explain the choice of a ruler of a country. The conditions that must be met for a mass killing regime to win over alternative regimes are derived. Using the COW project data over the period 1816-1997, we estimate two models: negative binomial regression of number of battle-related deaths and a probit model for the choice of mass killing. The paper concludes with suggestions for data collections and further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Sang Hoo Bae & Attiat Ott, 2008. "Predatory Behavior Of Governments: The Case Of Mass Killing," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(2), pages 107-125.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:19:y:2008:i:2:p:107-125
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690701516846

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    Cited by:

    1. Joan Esteban & Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2015. "Strategic Mass Killings," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(5), pages 1087-1132.
    2. repec:kap:iaecre:v:15:y:2009:i:3:p:351-361 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Frances Stewart, 2011. "Economic and Political Causes of Genocidal Violence: A comparison with findings on the causes of civil war," Research Working Papers 46, MICROCON - A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict.
    4. Chyanda Querido, 2009. "State-Sponsored Mass Killing in African Wars—Greed or Grievance?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 15(3), pages 351-361, August.
    5. Attiat F. Ott & Sang Hoo Bae, 2011. "Modeling Mass Killing: For Gain or Ethnic Cleansing?," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 4 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    Mass killing; Vertical differentiation;


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