Explaining institutional change in international patent politics

This article seeks to explain institutional change in international patent politics since the conclusion of the 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (trips). I argue that the distribution of interests in this issue area adheres to a sharp North–South distinction, and that the pursuit of largely incompatible and conflicting patent agendas by industrialised and developing countries, respectively, has led to the gradual emergence of an international patent regime complex. Focusing on trips-plus measures under various Free Trade Agreements, patent enforcement clubs and a range of UN organisations which have recently gained relevance for international patent politics, I show how the distribution of interests in this area has led to the development of two parallel and partially inconsistent international governance structures. I conclude that the distribution of interests explains the propensity of regime complexes towards stability and change, with institutional change being particularly pronounced when overlapping interests among revisionist actors enhance the prospects of collective action.