Configurations of factors affecting the equity structure in PPP projects: a resource-dependent perspective

Reasonable PPP equity structures enhance the resource advantages of shareholders, promoting project success. However, many factors influencing PPP project equity structures remain underexplored, particularly regarding the resource advantages of each shareholder and the combinatory effects of various factors. This study takes into account the resource advantages of PPP project shareholders and employs fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyze 51 PPP projects from 30 countries, identifying the antecedent configurations that affect the equity structure of PPP projects. The main findings include: (1) Regarding the government shareholding ratio, we find that for large-scale projects, low economic risk or low political risk significantly attracts private sector investment and enables the government to maintain a minor shareholding. Under high political risk, the user-pays method can facilitate low government shareholding, whereas the government-pay method requires the government to increase its ownership. (2) Concerning the controlling shareholder identity, we find that low political risk is more effective than low economic risk in attracting construction contractors to hold control in large-scale projects. In environments characterized by high economic and political risks, construction and operating contractors can assume the role of controlling shareholders, provided the investment scale is small and the project’s relative complexity aligns with their respective expertise. Professional investors play a vital role in large-scale projects but prefer controlling stakes in ventures with low economic and political risks. The findings reveal the core conditions that affect PPP project equity structures and their complex interactions, and can offer valuable insights for organizing PPP project equity structures.