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Decisions with moral content: collusion

Author

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  • Anna Zarkada-Fraser
  • Martin Skitmore

Abstract

Morality is fast becoming an integral part of the mandate for business through both societal and regulatory pressures. Collusive tendering is one of the moral choices facing decision-makers in the construction industry. This paper describes an empirical investigation of the attitudes and behavioural intent towards collusive tendering of key individuals in the tendering process. It also explores the factors that determine these attitudes. The results of the empirical investigation indicate that there is a minority of decision-makers that admit they would consider participating in some form of collusive tendering agreement under certain circumstances. These people form a distinct group in their demographic as well as decision-making profile.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Zarkada-Fraser & Martin Skitmore, 2000. "Decisions with moral content: collusion," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 101-111.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:conmgt:v:18:y:2000:i:1:p:101-111
    DOI: 10.1080/014461900370997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Paha, 2013. "The Impact of Persistent Shocks and Concave Objective Functions on Collusive Behavior," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201328, Philipps-Universit├Ąt Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    2. Ilya Morozov & Elena Podkolzina, 2013. "Collusion detection in procurement auctions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 25/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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