Deterrence, coercion, desecuritization: three lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian war

Why do Western responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seem contradictory – simultaneously deterring Moscow while pursuing negotiations, arming Ukraine while restricting weapons use, isolating Russia diplomatically while offering dialogue? This article identifies three competing security logics driving policy: de-securitization (seeking diplomatic settlement), deterrence (preventing escalation to NATO territory), and coercion (forcing Russian withdrawal). Despite the Copenhagen School’s claim that de-securitization is normatively superior, I demonstrate that premature peace initiatives without addressing the security threat embolden aggressors rather than reduce conflict. Deterrence and coercion both securitize Russia as a threat, but differ fundamentally: deterrence is passive and status-quo preserving; coercion is reactive and seeks to reverse aggression through conditional punishment. Western policy since 2022 has attempted all three simultaneously: a “strategic ambiguity” that undermines credibility. Deterrence without extended guarantees for Ukraine creates a credibility gap Russia exploits. Coercion with excessive assurances incentivizes Russia to treat negotiations as capitulation rather than compromise. The result: Russia pays minimal costs for aggression while Ukraine remains vulnerable. The article shows that hybrid approaches combining incompatible logics produce policy failure, with consequences extending way beyond Ukraine.