Appearances can be deceiving – The Swedish Bank Act and actor influence in different regulatory regimes

In this paper, the influence over the development of the Swedish Bank Act between 1912 and 1968 is studied using preference attainment. Results show that the Financial Supervisory Authority was the most influential actor until 1933, when the Bank Act became gradually stricter. Between 1955 and 1968, the Bankers’ Association grew more influential and the Bank Act was liberalised. The regime perspective on regulatory development suggests that regulation was more liberal during the Classic regime in the early twentieth century when business interests prevailed, and stricter from around the 1930s in the State regime when government control increased. The results are thus contrary to the regime perspective. It is proposed that economic ideas that were engrained in the regulatory institution from its foundation were more important to the long-term development of that institution and of the influence exerted over it, rather than prevailing ideas embodied in regulatory regimes.