Analyst recommendations, acquirer’s valuation, and M&A performance: evidence from China

This study investigates the effects of premerger analyst recommendations on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcement returns. We find that M&A announcement returns decrease with premerger analysts’ favourable recommendations (PAFR). Furthermore, we find that increasing acquirers’ valuations in the preannouncement period is a possible channel that allows PAFR to reduce M&A announcement returns. We explore three alternative explanations including, ‘analyst information role’, ‘analyst pressure’ and ‘informed trading’ explanations for our main nexus, and our findings are still robust. In an additional analysis, we find that this negative relationship is more pronounced among acquirers with (a) high information uncertainty (b), low media criticism, and (c) high investor attention. Moreover, we identify three sources of conflicts of interest in analyst recommendations: M&A relations, controlling shareholder share pledging, and stock ownership composition. Our research enriches the impact of analysts’ recommendations on M&A outcomes and provides new empirical evidence of analysts’ strengthening of overvaluation.