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Non-cooperative corporate social responsibility, bargaining, and double marginalization in bilateral monopoly

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  • Shih-Shen Chen
  • Leonard F.S. Wang
  • Di Wu
  • Chien-Shu Tsai

Abstract

This study incorporates CSR concerns in a general demand model focusing on the double marginalization problem in single-product successive monopolies. It assumes that the manufacturer or retailer non-cooperatively engages in CSR activities and bargains over the linear input price. The findings demonstrate that the ratio of retail and wholesale pass-through depends not only on the demand curvature and its derivative but also on the firm’s CSR weights and relative bargaining power. In a bilateral monopoly, including CSR considerations by either the manufacturer or the retailer may alleviate the double marginalization problem when bargaining over the linear wholesale price.

Suggested Citation

  • Shih-Shen Chen & Leonard F.S. Wang & Di Wu & Chien-Shu Tsai, 2025. "Non-cooperative corporate social responsibility, bargaining, and double marginalization in bilateral monopoly," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(31), pages 4499-4505, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:57:y:2025:i:31:p:4499-4505
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2024.2364076
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