IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

On 'CU can dominate UTR'


  • Ali El-Agraa
  • Anthony Jones


For a decade and a half, Cooper and Massell's (1965) conclusion that a policy of unilateral tariff reduction (UTR) is superior to the formation of a customs union (CU) remained unchallenged. However Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) using a more realistic model, claimed to show that UTR need not dominate a CU. Here, we point out that the Wonnacott and Wonnacott model is incomplete since their CU does not have a common external tariff, and demonstrate that the incorporation of such a tariff in their analysis restores the validity of the Cooper and Massell proposition.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali El-Agraa & Anthony Jones, 2000. "On 'CU can dominate UTR'," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(5), pages 301-304.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:7:y:2000:i:5:p:301-304 DOI: 10.1080/135048500351438

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ian Domowitz & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 1986. "Business Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, Spring.
    2. Hall, Robert E, 1988. "The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 921-947, October.
    3. Schmalensee, Richard, 1989. "Inter-industry studies of structure and performance," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 951-1009 Elsevier.
    4. Roeger, Werner, 1995. "Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Difference between Primal and Dual Productivity Measures? Estimates for U.S. Manufacturing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 316-330, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:7:y:2000:i:5:p:301-304. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Chris Longhurst). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.