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The effect of continuous-time cheap talk in the experimental minimum effort game

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  • Hisashi Toku
  • Tatsuhiro Shichijo
  • Kazuhito Ogawa

Abstract

We experimentally investigated whether continuous-time cheap talk improves the effort level in a minimal effort game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. In each round of the game, a player freely changes the message before he or she makes decisions, and constantly monitors other members’ messages. We have two results. First, continuous-time cheap talk realizes a higher effort level than does one-shot cheap talk. Second, the group in which every member chooses the maximum effort in the first two rounds eventually achieves an efficient outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Hisashi Toku & Tatsuhiro Shichijo & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2022. "The effect of continuous-time cheap talk in the experimental minimum effort game," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(8), pages 687-699, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:29:y:2022:i:8:p:687-699
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1884828
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