IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Efficiency of internal capital market under a controlling-minority-shareholder structure

  • Daehwan Kim
  • Taeyoon Sung

We examine the efficiency of the internal capital market under three alternative ownership structures -- the dispersed ownership, the concentrated ownership and the Controlling-Minority-Shareholder (CMS) structure. Although the highest efficiency is achieved under the concentrated ownership, our analysis shows that the efficiency is higher under the CMS structure than under the dispersed ownership. The efficiency gain is greater if the agency problem between shareholders and the Headquarter (HQ) manager is greater. The conclusion of the analysis is in line with the observed patterns of firm organization in developing economies.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 19 (2012)
Issue (Month): 18 (December)
Pages: 1889-1892

in new window

Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:19:y:2012:i:18:p:1889-1892
Contact details of provider: Web page:

Order Information: Web:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:19:y:2012:i:18:p:1889-1892. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.