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Prohibition Of Parallel Imports As A Hard Core Restriction Of Article 4 Of Block Exception Regulation For Vertical Agreements European Law And Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Nikolaos ZEVGOLIS

    (Athens University of Economics and Business Athens Greece)

  • Panagiotis FOTIS

    (University of Central Greece Athens Greece)

Abstract

This paper attempts to highlight the main principles of Competition Law regulatory and case law framework covering the prohibition of parallel imports and to reveal the main effects of it on the competitive structure of the market Especially the regulatory framework relates Block Exception Regulation 330 2010 with Block Exception Regulation 461 2010 in order to determine whether prohibition of parallel imports constitutes a hardcore restriction or not while the economic analysis evaluates it in a vertical market with few suppliers buyers which sell goods to the final domestic consumers The results indicate that the prohibition of parallel imports by upstream sellers cause vertical restraints to the domestic customers of the buyers In any case this paper focusing mainly on consumer welfare does not necessarily link parallel imports with the notion of parallel trade and or parallel exports as well as it does not provide the pros and cons of parallel trade

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolaos ZEVGOLIS & Panagiotis FOTIS, 2011. "Prohibition Of Parallel Imports As A Hard Core Restriction Of Article 4 Of Block Exception Regulation For Vertical Agreements European Law And Economics," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 2(4), pages 162-174.
  • Handle: RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:162-174
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Panagiotis Fotis & Michael Polemis & Nikolaos Zevgolis, 2011. "Robust Event Studies for Derogation from Suspension of Concentrations in Greece during the Period 1995–2008," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 67-89, March.
    2. Melinda Acutt & Caroline Elliott, 2001. "Threat-Based Competition Policy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 309-317, May.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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