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Verhandeln in der Eurogruppe unter Vorbehalt des Bundestags
[Bargaining in the Eurogroup Subject to the German Bundestag]

Author

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  • Andreas Wimmel

    (Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Bevor die Bundesregierung der Gewährung von Stabilitätshilfen für Mitgliedstaaten der Eurozone zustimmen kann, muss sie ein Mandat des Bundestags einholen. Inwieweit schränkt ein solcher Parlamentsvorbehalt die Verhandlungsspielräume in der Eurogruppe ein? Am Beispiel des dritten Hilfsprogramms für Griechenland zeigt sich, dass kurzfristige Änderungen der Bedingungen, unter denen Kredittranchen ausbezahlt werden, kaum möglich sind. Zudem konnte sich die Eurogruppe auf keine Schuldenerleichterungen verständigen, die der Internationale Währungsfonds als Voraussetzung für eine finanzielle Beteiligung eingefordert hatte.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Wimmel, 2018. "Verhandeln in der Eurogruppe unter Vorbehalt des Bundestags [Bargaining in the Eurogroup Subject to the German Bundestag]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 98(1), pages 24-29, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:98:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10273-018-2236-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-018-2236-4
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    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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