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Fußball-Bundesliga: Zentralvermarktung und Beihilfen fördern Dominanz einzelner Clubs

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  • Michael Drewes

Abstract

In order to maintain competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome, professional sports leagues have developed several kinds of distribution mechanisms. For example, in Germany one of these is the collective selling of television rights for football matches by the league organisation, which enables the league to share television revenues. In this article it is argued that central marketing and sharing of television revenues in German football does not enhance competitive balance among members of the Bundesliga but rather leads to a lesser degree of competitive balance and thus less uncertainty of outcome in the league. Because public broadcasting stations pay for television rights from which some clubs profit more than others, it can be seen as illegal state aid for these clubs. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Drewes, 2014. "Fußball-Bundesliga: Zentralvermarktung und Beihilfen fördern Dominanz einzelner Clubs," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 94(8), pages 588-593, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:94:y:2014:i:8:p:588-593
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-014-1719-1
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    Keywords

    H23; M42; P00;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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