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Feste Benzinpreise für einen Tag — Mehr Preiswettbewerb durch die 24h-Regel?


  • Andreas Reindl
  • Thomas Wein


The German Cartel Office’s recent study of retail gasoline markets provides strong evidence of an oligopoly in which the major suppliers coordinate pricing strategies and achieve supracompetitive prices. Competition law enforcement does not provide effective tools to improve market outcomes. We examine the potential benefits of a regulatory framework that would require gasoline suppliers to announce at a specified time their prices for the following day and prohibit price changes during a 24-hour period. Such a 24-hour rule could complicate coordination and lead to lower prices, although it cannot be ruled out that the oligopolists would adjust and develop new coordination strategies. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Reindl & Thomas Wein, 2012. "Feste Benzinpreise für einen Tag — Mehr Preiswettbewerb durch die 24h-Regel?," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;German National Library of Economics, vol. 92(10), pages 678-686, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:92:y:2012:i:10:p:678-686
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-012-1438-4

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Wein, 2014. "Preventing Margin Squeeze: An Unsolvable Puzzle for Competition Policy? The Case of the German Gasoline Market," Working Paper Series in Economics 309, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item


    D43; L13; L51;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation


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