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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emergency Management of the Middle Route of South-to-North Water Diversion Project

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  • Li Hongyan

    (Henan University of Engineering, Zhengzhou
    Hohai University)

Abstract

In order to improve the efficiency of emergency management of the Middle Route of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP), and to guarantee the water supply function of the project, the intergovernmental cooperation system of emergency management for emergent events in the Middle Route of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project was established. The cooperation models of emergent events were built using Evolutionary Game Theory. The evolutionary influence of system parameters on respective governmental behaviour was analysed. The payment functions of the emergency agents involved were constructed, the corresponding replicator dynamic equations were established and evolutionary stable strategies were discussed. Theoretical and numerical analysis results show that: In order to let local government show strong willingness to implement emergency policies, the profit caused by local government i increases its implement policy willingness to more than the increased cost. Only MWR increases the penalty on local government when it shows weak willingness and let the penalty be more than the cost increased by weak willingness, can avoid all local government select weak cooperative willingness.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Hongyan, 2017. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emergency Management of the Middle Route of South-to-North Water Diversion Project," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 31(9), pages 2777-2789, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:31:y:2017:i:9:d:10.1007_s11269-017-1661-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-017-1661-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Jida Liu & Changqi Dong & Shi An & Yanan Guo, 2021. "Research on the Natural Hazard Emergency Cooperation Behavior between Governments and Social Organizations Based on the Hybrid Mechanism of Incentive and Linkage in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(24), pages 1-27, December.
    2. Jida Liu & Yanan Guo & Shi An & Chenxi Lian, 2021. "A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(21), pages 1-29, November.
    3. Meng Liu & Wenwen Ding & Yali Lu, 2022. "Collaborative Management of a Sustainable Supply Chain in a Water Diversion Project," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(8), pages 2665-2683, June.

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