Social choice theory and the “Centre de Mathématique Sociale”: some historical notes
In this paper we describe some research directions in social choice and aggregation theory led at the “Centre de Mathématique Sociale“ since the fifties. We begin by presenting some institutional aspects concerning this EHESS center. Then we sketch a thematic history by considering the following questions about the "effet Condorcet" (“voting paradox“): What is it? How is it overcome? Why does it occur? These questions were tackled in Guilbaud's 1952 paper (Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème logique de l'agrégation) which will be our leading clue for our inquiry. The conclusion outline some more recent developments researches linked to these questions.
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Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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