Two egalitarian consensus rules
We widen both the domain and codomain of Arrovian social choice, towards respectively profiles of extended orderings and quasi-orderings. We propose, discuss, and characterize two egalitarian consensus rules – a unanimity-leximin and a lexi-unanimity-min rule – which combine the corresponding standard rules in different ways. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
Volume (Year): 22 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:22:y:2004:i:3:p:567-578. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.