Rights as alternative game forms
The paper analyzes the problem of modeling rights using extensive game forms with perfect information. Three dimensions of rights – protocol, autonomy and power – are identified and it is shown, that under a certain condition, the effectivity function captures completely all rights relevant aspects of a game form. The condition under which this is possible is interpretable both as a particular formulation of individual liberty and as a rejection of consequentialism. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
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Volume (Year): 22 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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