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Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria

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  • Sang-Chul Suh

    () (Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada)

Abstract

In a marriage problem, we introduce a condition called "exclusive matchability (EM)": the condition mainly says that each pair of a man and a woman can choose to be a matching pair regardless of others' actions. This condition is essential to strong Nash implementation of the stable rule. We show that any mechanism which satisfies exclusive matchability implements the stable rule in strong Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Sang-Chul Suh, 2003. "Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(1), pages 33-39.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:1:p:33-39
    Note: Received: 17 May 1999/Accepted: 30 August 2001
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    1. repec:eee:apmaco:v:265:y:2015:i:c:p:911-927 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip, 2009. "Constrained school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1921-1947, September.

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