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Collusion, renegotiation and implementation

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  • Sandeep Baliga

    () (Kellogg Graduate School of Management, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2009, USA Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de EconomiĀ“a de la Empressa, Calle Madrid 126, E-28903 Getafe , Spain)

  • Sandro Brusco

    () (Kellogg Graduate School of Management, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2009, USA Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de EconomiĀ“a de la Empressa, Calle Madrid 126, E-28903 Getafe , Spain)

Abstract

We study the implementation problem for exchange economies when agents can renegotiate the outcome assigned by the planner and can collude. We focus on the use of sequential mechanisms and present a simple sufficient condition for implementation with renegotiation in strong perfect equilibrium. We present an application to optimal risk sharing, showing that the possibility of collusion and renegotiation does not in general prevent the implementation of efficient allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandeep Baliga & Sandro Brusco, 2000. "Collusion, renegotiation and implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 69-83.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:1:p:69-83
    Note: Received: 27 August 1997/Accepted: 29 October 1998
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
    2. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.

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