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Rational choice and revealed preference without binariness

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  • Klaus Nehring

    (Department of Economics, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA)

Abstract

This paper attempts to provide a unified account of the rationalization of possibly non-binary choice-functions by "Extended Preference Relations" (relations between sets and elements). The analysis focuses on transitive EPRs for which three choice-functional characterizations are given, two of them based on novel axioms. Transitive EPRs are shown to be rationalizable by sets of orderings that are "closed under compromise"; this novel requirement is argued to be the key to establish a canonical relationship between sets of orderings and choice-functions. The traditional assumption of "binariness" on preference relations or choice functions is shown to be analytically unhelpful and normatively unfounded; non-binariness may arise from "unresolvedness of preference", a previously unrecognized aspect of preference incompleteness.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Nehring, 1997. "Rational choice and revealed preference without binariness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(3), pages 403-425.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:403-425 Note: Received: 28 August 1995/Accepted: 14 February 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Alcantud, Jose C.R., 2006. "Maximality with or without binariness: Transfer-type characterizations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 182-191, March.
    2. Özgür Evren, 2012. "Scalarization Methods and Expected Multi-Utility Representations," Working Papers w0174, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    3. Heller, Yuval, 2012. "Justifiable choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 375-390.
    4. Dubra, Juan & Maccheroni, Fabio & Ok, Efe A., 2004. "Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 118-133, March.
    5. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2004. "Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice: Sequential Rationalizability and Rational Shortlist Methods," IZA Discussion Papers 1239, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    6. Mandler, Michael, 2005. "Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 255-277, February.
    7. repec:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:138-141 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. M. Carmen Sánchez & Juan-Vicente Llinares & Begoña Subiza, 2003. "A KKM-result and an application for binary and non-binary choice functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 185-193, January.
    9. Alcantud, J. C. R., 2002. "Non-binary choice in a non-deterministic model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 117-123, September.
    10. Evren, Özgür, 2014. "Scalarization methods and expected multi-utility representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 30-63.
    11. Danilov, V. & Koshevoy, G., 2005. "Mathematics of Plott choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 245-272, May.
    12. Llinares, Juan-Vicente & Sanchez, M. Carmen, 1999. "Non-binary choice functions on non-compact sets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 29-32, April.
    13. McCarthy, David & Mikkola, Kalle & Thomas, Teruji, 2017. "Representation of strongly independent preorders by sets of scalar-valued functions," MPRA Paper 79284, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2004. "Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice," Microeconomics 0407005, EconWPA, revised 21 Dec 2005.
    15. Eliaz, Kfir & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Indifference or indecisiveness? Choice-theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 61-86, July.

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