Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps (*)
We consider continuous aggregation maps (e.g., social welfare functions). By assuming that the voters have preferences over social outcomes, we regard the social decision procedure as a noncooperative game, with the aggregation map as a game form. The map is called strategy-proof if it is a Nash equilibrium that the voters report their most preferred outcomes. We give sufficient topological conditions on the space of outcomes so that only dictatorial maps are strategy-proof.
Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 28 February 1994/Accepted: April 22, 1996|
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