Trade-off between equity and efficiency in a general economy with indivisible goods
In most of the recent literature on fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods and a single infinitely divisible good, it is assumed that each agent can consume at most one indivisible good. In this paper, we show that if this assumption is dropped, there do not necessarily exist envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations. However, envy-free allocations still exist and so do Pareto efficient allocations. Hence, a trade-off between equity and efficiency arises.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 13 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Note:||Received: 17 February 1995/Accepted: 16 June 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:4:p:445-450. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.