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Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments

Author

Listed:
  • Sanjay Srivastava

    (Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA)

  • Michael A. Trick

    (Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA)

Abstract

A voting rule maps voter preferences into outcomes, and is called sophisticated if there exists a voting tree whose sophisticated outcomes coincide with the voting rule for every voter preference. As yet, no complete characterization of such rules is available. In this paper, we provide an important step toward this characterization by completely solving the problem when there are two possible sets of voter preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanjay Srivastava & Michael A. Trick, 1996. "Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(3), pages 275-289.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:275-289 Note: Received: 2 November 1993/Accepted: 18 April 1995
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-131, February.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:34-47_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutia & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 2013. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 5, pages 97-111 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004. "An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 783-797.
    6. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    7. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
    8. Weber, Robert J., 1994. "Games in coalitional form," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 36, pages 1285-1303 Elsevier.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:02:p:405-422_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, pages 405-422.
    11. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1984. "Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control," Working Papers 524, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2007. "Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 111-126, March.

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