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Zur Bewertung von Mehrstimmrechten

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Hering

    (Fern-Universität Hagen)

  • Michael Olbrich

    (Fern-Universität Hagen)

Abstract

Summary Article 11 No. 1 of KonTraG makes it easier to abolish multiple voting rights in return for a decent compensation. The valuation of multiple voting rights, which is necessary for fixing the amount of compensation, is a purchase/sale type of conflict that can occur either in a fragmented or a non-fragmented constellation. The authors show with their model that a corporation will pay a compensation only in those cases when multiple vote shareholders hold a minority of voting capital and are as well able to prove that their dividends decrease due to the abolition of the multiple voting rights because of a change in corporate governance. It is shown how the amount of compensation must be determined both in case of a perfect and an imperfect capital market. The theoretical results are compared with empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Hering & Michael Olbrich, 2001. "Zur Bewertung von Mehrstimmrechten," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 20-38, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:1:d:10.1007_bf03372640
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372640
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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