Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space
This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many households with possibly non-ordered preferences. We explicitly construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural economic meanings. Under a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully implements the Walras equilibria. If this condition is not fulfilled, our mechanism nevertheless implements the constrained Walras equilibria. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
Volume (Year): 9 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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