IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tax implementability of fair allocations


  • Yukihiro Nishimura



This paper examines the tax implementability of allocations based on fairness as no-envy (or envy-freeness) and its alternatives, by a tax schedule that depends on labor supply and gross income ((y,l)-implementability). A relevant incentive constraint is perishability of abilities, where agents can exert a lower ability level than they actually possess. We first show that in any economy, every envy-free allocation is (y,l)-implementable. On the other hand, whereas we already know that no-envy may be incompatible with first-best Pareto efficiency, the alternative equity concepts which circumvent this first-best equity-efficiency trade-off meet the obstacle of tax implementability even when labor supply is observable. We also clarify necessary and sufficient domain restrictions under which the egalitarian equivalent allocations satisfy the (y,l)-implementability condition. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Yukihiro Nishimura, 2004. "Tax implementability of fair allocations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(1), pages 31-41, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2004:i:1:p:31-41
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-004-0118-2

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Ngo Van Long & Frank Stähler, 2012. "Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 932-948, September.


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2004:i:1:p:31-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.