Up-front payment under RD rule
This paper explores the effect of an up-front payment to contracts under the reliance damage measure. We find that the efficiency in most cases fails, but can be obtained by a high enough total payment to assume away the seller’s breach, a high enough up-front payment to ensure that the seller does not sue, and a high enough trading price to ensure the buyer’s breach when the undesirable state occurs. Edlin’s device (1996), which has a very low trading price to assume away the buyer’s breach and a proper up-front payment to entice the seller to sign, fails to achieve the efficiency under the reliance damage measure. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 9 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.