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Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies



In exchange economies where agents have private information about their preferences, strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions are in general not efficient. We provide a restricted domain, namely the set of preferences representable by Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms which are strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational. In two-agent, two-good economies we are able to provide an even stronger result. We characterize the class of efficient and individually rational social choice functions, which are fully implementable in truthful strategies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Nicoló, 2004. "Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(4), pages 373-382, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:373-382 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0112-0

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III : Cournot competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 947-968, June.
    2. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, "undated". ""An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games''," CARESS Working Papres 95-15, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    3. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-569, May.
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