A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference
We show that Barberá and Sonnenschein’s (1978) power function becomes additive if we replace the Paretian condition by nonimposition and monotonicity. Since these conditions are very much in the spirit of Arrow (1951), our result sharpens the analogy to Arrow’s theorem. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003
Volume (Year): 8 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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