IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v5y2000i1p59-70.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

original papers: On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers

Author

Listed:
  • Domenico Menicucci

    (Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata alle Scienze Umane, UniversitÁ degli Studi di Torino, 10122 Torino, Italy)

Abstract

Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) show that this is not the case when there are at least two buyers. In the latter context, if the highest possible seller's valuation is not too large, we provide an ex post efficient mechanism in which the mechanism designer and the agents are not required to know the probability distribution for the seller's valuation.

Suggested Citation

  • Domenico Menicucci, 2000. "original papers: On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 59-70.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:1:p:59-70
    Note: Received: February 18, 1998 / Accepted: September 10, 1999
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/0005001/00050059.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incomplete information; mechanism design; efficient mechanisms; first price auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:1:p:59-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.