On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
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- Baumeister, Dorothea & Erdélyi, Gábor & Erdélyi, Olivia J. & Rothe, Jörg, 2015. "Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 19-30.
- Ilan Nehama, 2013. "Complexity of Optimal Lobbying in Threshold Aggregation," Discussion Paper Series dp642, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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KeywordsLobbying; Referendum; Parametrized complexity; D72;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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