IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reaccs/v5y2000i1d10.1023_a1009612901910.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intrafirm Trade, Bargaining Power, and Specific Investments

Author

Listed:
  • Tim Baldenius

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

This paper compares the performance of standard-cost with negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. Standard-cost transfer pricing confers more bargaining power to the supplier and therefore generates better incentives for this division to undertake specific investments. The opposite holds for buyer investments. If a corporate controller has disaggregated information about divisional costs and revenues, then the firm can improve upon the performance of standard-cost transfer pricing by setting a centralized transfer price equal to expected cost plus a suitably chosen mark-up.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Baldenius, 2000. "Intrafirm Trade, Bargaining Power, and Specific Investments," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 27-56, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:5:y:2000:i:1:d:10.1023_a:1009612901910
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1009612901910
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1009612901910
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1009612901910?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tai-Yeong Chung, 1991. "Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(5), pages 1031-1042.
    2. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    3. Christensen, J & Demski, JS, 1998. "Profit allocation under ancillary trade," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(1), pages 71-89.
    4. Bushman, RM & Indjejikian, RJ & Smith, A, 1995. "Aggregate performance measures in business unit manager compensation: The role of intrafirm interdependencies," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33, pages 101-128.
    5. Leininger, W. & Linhart, P. B. & Radner, R., 1989. "Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 63-106, June.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 201-228, Fall.
    7. Amin H. Amershi & Peter Cheng, 1990. "Intrafirm resource allocation: The economics of transfer pricing and cost allocations in accounting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 61-99, September.
    8. Tim Baldenius & Stefan Reichelstein & Savita A. Sahay, 1999. "Negotiated versus Cost-Based Transfer Pricing," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 67-91, June.
    9. Alfred Wagenhofer, 1994. "Transfer pricing under asymmetric information," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 71-103.
    10. Cavalluzzo, KS & Ittner, CD & Larcker, DF, 1998. "Competition, efficiency, and cost allocation in government agencies: Evidence on the Federal Reserve System," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(1), pages 1-32.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Pfeiffer & Ulf Schiller & Joachim Wagner, 2011. "Cost-based transfer pricing," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 219-246, June.
    2. Nicole Bastian Johnson, 2006. "Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 339-365, September.
    3. Jan Thomas Martini, 2015. "The optimal focus of transfer prices: pre-tax profitability versus tax minimization," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 866-898, June.
    4. Donna Wei, 2004. "Inter-Departmental Cost Allocation and Investment Incentives," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 97-116, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tim Baldenius & Stefan Reichelstein & Savita A. Sahay, 1999. "Negotiated versus Cost-Based Transfer Pricing," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 67-91, June.
    2. Thomas Pfeiffer & Ulf Schiller & Joachim Wagner, 2011. "Cost-based transfer pricing," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 219-246, June.
    3. Eric John Slof, 1999. "Transfer prices and incentive contracts in vertically-integrated divisionalized companies," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(2), pages 265-286.
    4. V. G. Narayanan & Michael Smith, 2000. "Impact of Competition and Taxes on Responsibility Center Organization and Transfer Prices," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 497-529, September.
    5. Nicole Bastian Johnson, 2006. "Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 339-365, September.
    6. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
    7. Clemens Löffler & Thomas Pfeiffer & Ulf Schiller & Joachim Wagner, 2011. "Zentralisierung, Transferpreise und spezifische Investitionen: Ein selektiver Verfahrensvergleich," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(63), pages 1-33, January.
    8. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    9. Edward Johnson & Nicole Bastian Johnson & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2016. "Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 140-164, March.
    10. John A. Christensen, 2004. "Discussion," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 231-235, May.
    11. Robert F. Göx, 2010. "Discussion of “decentralized capacity management and internal pricing”," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 479-502, September.
    12. Tim Baldenius & Stefan Reichelstein, 1998. "Alternative Verfahren zur Bestimmung innerbetrieblicher Verrechnungspreise," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 236-259, March.
    13. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2012. "Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1162, The University of Melbourne.
    14. Tim Baldenius, 2006. "Discussion of “Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets”," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 367-376, September.
    15. Kittsteiner, Thomas, 2003. "Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 54-76, July.
    16. Christian Hofmann & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2006. "Verfügungsrechte und spezifische Investitionen: Steuerung über Budgets oder Verrechnungspreise?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 426-454, June.
    17. Yumou Fei, 2022. "Improved Approximation to First-Best Gains-from-Trade," Papers 2205.00140, arXiv.org.
    18. Suvorov Anton & Tsybuleva Natalia, 2010. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-35, November.
    19. Savita A. Sahay, 2014. "Transfer Pricing in a Multi-Product Environment," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 3(4), pages 132-132, August.
    20. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:5:y:2000:i:1:d:10.1023_a:1009612901910. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.