Nudges, norms and moral progress

The compatibility of nudges with moral action and reasoning has become a focal point in philosophical discourse. While some argue that nudges may inhibit genuine moral responsiveness, others advocate their use to promote morally desirable outcomes, particularly in other-regarding contexts. This paper assesses whether other-regarding nudges are compatible with, and could contribute to moral progress, as conceived by moral and political philosophers. We contend that other-regarding nudges can be compatible with moral progress when they facilitate and reinforce a morally desirable social norm or help overturn a morally undesirable social norm, specifically when they (1) induce improvements in moral behavior, while (2) not worsening the quality of our moral reasoning or our moral beliefs as they were prior to the intervention. For nudges to achieve this, they must be easy to resist, they should not obfuscate moral reasons for action, and they should help individuals in saving up limited cognitive bandwidth. Our account of the moral progressiveness of nudging has three key strengths: it aligns with less stringent views on moral worth, complements accounts of moral progress emphasizing the insufficiency of moral reasoning, and mitigates stability concerns by anchoring nudges in desirable social norms. By demonstrating how heuristics-triggering nudges can facilitate moral progress, we offer a framework that reconciles their practical effectiveness with the demands of moral philosophy.