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Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games

Author

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  • Mark Voorneveld
  • Stef Tijs
  • Sofia Grahn

Abstract

Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic allocation scheme, where the value of each coalition is divided over its members in such a way that the clan members receive a higher, and the non-clan members a lower share as the coalitions grow larger. Each core element of a total clan game can be extended to both a population monotonic and a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. In total clan games where the clan consists of a single member (the so-called big boss) the use of the nucleolus as an allocation mechanism gives rise to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Voorneveld & Stef Tijs & Sofia Grahn, 2003. "Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 56(3), pages 439-449, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:mathme:v:56:y:2003:i:3:p:439-449
    DOI: 10.1007/s001860200240
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    Cited by:

    1. Brânzei, R. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H., 2003. "Type Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Multi-Glove Games," Discussion Paper 2003-34, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Muto, S. & Ishihara, S. & Fukuda, E., 2002. "Fuzzy Clan Games and Bi-monotonic Allocation Rules," Other publications TiSEM b5200e92-83d8-4fd9-b7f2-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Alparslan-Gok, S.Z. & Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Big Boss Interval Games," Discussion Paper 2008-47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Alparslan-Gok, S.Z. & Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Big Boss Interval Games," Other publications TiSEM af1490df-9a9d-4261-8e7d-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Muto, S. & Ishihara, S. & Fukuda, E., 2002. "Fuzzy Clan Games and Bi-monotonic Allocation Rules," Discussion Paper 2002-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Brânzei, R. & Scotti, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Torre, A., 2002. "Discretization of Information Collecting Situations and Continuity of Compensation Rules," Discussion Paper 2002-18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Brânzei, R. & Scotti, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Torre, A., 2002. "Discretization of Information Collecting Situations and Continuity of Compensation Rules," Other publications TiSEM 329f159f-01a1-42b7-b8e2-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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