IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joevec/v10y2000i4p437-447.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

orignal paper: Species survival and evolutionary stability in sustainable habitats

Author

Listed:
  • Werner G, th

    (Humboldt-University of Berlin, Department of Economics, Institute for Economic Theory III, Spandauer Stra, e 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany (e-mail: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de)

  • Robert Aumann

    (Mathematics Institute, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904, Israel)

Abstract

Whoever exists belongs to a species, which did not become extinct, has a (geno-)type, which should be well adjusted, and lives in a habitat which has been sustainable for a long time. We do not only analyze interspecies competition and the conditions for species survival, but also intraspecies competition of (geno-)types as in evolutionary biology and game theory. Survival in inter- and intraspecies competition together with sustainability define ecological stability, a concept which we illustrate by an example of solitary and social grazers who compete for food supply and who are endangered by the same predators. Although our approach is inspired by empirical evidence, no systematic attempt is made to apply it to some specific ecology.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner G, th & Robert Aumann, 2000. "orignal paper: Species survival and evolutionary stability in sustainable habitats," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 437-447.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:10:y:2000:i:4:p:437-447
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00191/papers/0010004/00100437.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ecological stability - Species survival - Inter- and intraspecies competition;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:10:y:2000:i:4:p:437-447. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.