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A discrete characterization of Slutsky symmetry (*)

Author

Listed:
  • David Jerison

    (Department of Mathematics, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA)

  • Michael Jerison

    (Department of Economics, SUNY, Albany, NY 12222, USA)

Abstract

A smooth demand function is generated by utility maximization if and only if its Slutsky matrix is symmetric and negative semidefinite. Slutsky symmetry is equivalent to absence of smooth revealed preference cycles, cf. Hurwicz and Richter (Econometrica 1979). To observe such a cycle would require a continuum of data. We characterize Slutsky symmetry by means of discrete "antisymmetric" revealed preference cycles consisting of either three or four observations.

Suggested Citation

  • David Jerison & Michael Jerison, 1996. "A discrete characterization of Slutsky symmetry (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 229-237.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:8:y:1996:i:2:p:229-237 Note: Received: June 8, 1995; Accepted: August 7, 1995
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fang, Hanming, 2002. "Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(3-4), pages 351-371, September.
    2. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    3. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 289-294.
    4. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Victor H. Aguiar & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Slutsky Matrix Norms and the Size of Bounded Rationality," Working Papers 2013-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.

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